April 2025 | Legal Case Updates | Mandated Reports, Stalking, Criminal Procedure, Firearms, and More

MANDATED REPORTERS: MANDATED REPORTER MUST FILE MALTREATMENT REPORT EVEN IF CHILD REACHED ADULTHOOD PRIOR TO THE DISCLOSURE

Appellant disclosed to his therapist in 2021 that he had sexual contact with his children’s babysitter when she was 17 years old, but she had since turned 18. As a mandated reporter, the therapist filed a maltreatment report. After Appellant was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct, he moved to exclude the therapist’s report and testimony, claiming they were protected by privilege. The district court denied the motion, finding the report was mandatory, and Appellant was found guilty after a jury trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The mandated reporter statute requires persons designated as mandated reporters, including therapists, to immediately report maltreatment when they “know[] or ha[ve] reason to believe a child is being maltreated… or has been maltreated within the preceding three years.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 1(a)(1). Maltreatment includes when a child has been subjected to acts constituting criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subds. 12, 20.

Generally, statements made by a client to certain mental health professionals are privileged under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g). However, this privilege is subject to the exception contained in Minn. Stat. § 260E.04, which provides that “[n]o evidence relating to the maltreatment of a child or to any prior incident of maltreatment involving any of the same persons accused of maltreatment shall be excluded in any proceeding arising out of the alleged maltreatment on the grounds of privilege set forth in section 595.02, subdivision 1, paragraph (a), (d), or (g).”

The Supreme Court looks to the legislative intent behind the mandated reporter statute, which is not only protecting individual children, but also ensuring the safety of all children in the community. This purpose is served only if the statute is interpreted to require maltreatment reports when a child is or has been maltreated within the preceding three years, even if the child has since reached adulthood. Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Martens, A22-1349, 18 N.W.3d 752 (Minn. Apr. 2, 2025).

STALKING: JURY NEED NOT AGREE ON WHICH PREDICATE OFFENSES WERE COMMITTED FOR FELONY STALKING

M.B and Appellant began a romantic relationship, and Appellant moved into M.B.’s apartment. Six months later, police conducted a welfare check on M.B. and found her with injuries. At trial, M.B. testified Appellant physically abused her multiple times, threatened her with a gun, threatened to kill M.B., and forced her to engage in sexual acts with him and others. A jury found Appellant guilty of stalking, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, second-degree assault, promoting prostitution, and unlawful possession of a firearm.

The Court of Appeals finds there was no error in the district court’s instruction to the jury that it need not unanimously agree on which two qualifying predicate acts for stalking were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a felony to “engage[] in stalking… which the actor knows or has reason to know would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel terrorized or to fear bodily harm and which does cause this reaction on the part of the victim.” Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5. Stalking is “two or more acts within a five-year period that violate or attempt to violate the provisions of any of” a list of specific criminal statutes, including criminal sexual conduct, assault, and domestic assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(b).

The district court told the jury the State sought to prove stalking by proving at least two of the following criminal acts: first-degree criminal sexual conduct, second, degree assault, domestic assault by strangulation, and domestic assault. The court told the jury they “must unanimously find that at least two criminal acts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but [they] need not agree as to which criminal acts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

An element of felony stalking is engaging in “stalking,” which is established by two or more violations of specified statutes within a defined period. The element is the sum total of predicate acts – the predicate acts themselves are merely the means of satisfying the element, not the element itself.

The Court of Appeals also finds no error in the district court entering convictions for stalking, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and second-degree assault, as the offenses were not committed as part of a single behavioral incident. Appellant argued that, because the criminal sexual conduct and assault offenses were used as predicate offenses to prove stalking, they were part of the same behavioral incident. The court rejects the argument, finding no case law creating “a categorical rule that offenses that may constitute predicate acts for stalking always arise out of the same behavioral incident as stalking,” instead emphasizing the need to assess the “time, place, and criminal objective” of the offenses.

Here, the stalking, criminal sexual conduct, and second-degree assault offenses do not share a unity of time or place. They also had different objectives, varying from controlling and scaring M.B. to desire for financial and sexual gain. A separate sentence was properly imposed for these offenses. Appellant’s convictions are affirmed. State v. Boswell, A24-0116, 2025 WL 1021618 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2025).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: MOTION FOR NON-CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION DOES NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING THAT THE INFORMATION IS “MATERIAL AND FAVORABLE”

Appellant was charged with DWI, test refusal, and other charges after his vehicle was observed swerving. He filed a motion for the arresting officer’s squad car dash camera audit trail, arguing the officer had tampered with the dash camera footage disclosed to the defense, as well as a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. The motions were denied, and a jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of all charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1, requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense, without court order, all matters relating to the case within the State’s possession or control. Upon court order, however, the State may be required to disclose additional information, upon the defendant’s motion and a showing “that the information may relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or negate guilt or reduce the culpability of the defendant as to the offense charged.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 2(3). Prior case law discussing Rule 9.01, subd. 2(3), requires “some plausible showing that the information sought would be material and favorable” to the defense, if the information sought is confidential. State v. Underdahl, 676 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn. 2009) (quoting State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992)). The Supreme Court granted review in this case solely to determine whether the “material and favorable” standard also applies to discovery motions for non-confidential information.

The court first finds that Underdahl did not adopt the “material and favorable” standard for Rule 9.01, subd. 2(3), discovery motions, but instead merely referenced the standard’s use for motions regarding confidential information. The Court of Appeals erred here because it applied the “material and favorable” standard to Appellant’s motion for non-confidential information, and the district court erred because it did not determine whether the audit trail “may relate” to Appellant’s guilt or innocence.

Conducting the proper Rule 9.01, subd. 2(3), analysis, the court finds Appellant made an adequate showing that the audit trail may relate to his guilt or innocence. Further, because the record shows there was a 30-second period missing from the dash camera footage, it would be an abuse of discretion not to require the State to produce the audit trail to Appellant. Until the audit trail is disclosed, the court cannot determine whether the district court’s error was harmless. The conviction should stand if no tampering is shown in the audit trail, but a new suppression hearing is required if tampering is revealed. Reversed and remanded. State v. Manska, A23-0010, 19 N.W.3d 196 (Minn. Apr. 9, 2025).

FIREARMS: STATUTES PROHIBITING POSSESSION BY AN INELIGIBLE PERSON AND ALTERING SERIAL NUMBERS OF FIREARMS DO NOT VIOLATE THE SECOND AMENDMENT

Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and the obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of a firearm’s serial number. Prior to trial, the district court rejected Appellant’s argument that the statutes under which he was convicted, Minn. Stat. §§ 624.713, subd. 1(2), and 609.667(1), violated the Second Amendment.

Whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the Second Amendment depends on (1) whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the individual’s conduct (making the conduct presumptively protected by the Second Amendment), and (2) whether the government can justify the regulation by demonstrating it is consistent with the country’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022).

Section 624.713, subd. 1, prohibits persons convicted of a crime of violence from possessing “ammunition or a pistol or semiautomatic military-style assault weapon or [with one exception] any other firearm.” State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013), previously found the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court finds this decision was not overruled by Bruens. Moreover, section 624.713, subd. 1(2), satisfies the analytical framework adopted in Bruens, as felons are not protected by the Second Amendment and regulations prohibiting violent felons from possessing firearms is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Section 609.667(1) prohibits obliterating, removing, changing, or altering a firearm’s serial number. The constitutionality of the statute has not previously been considered. First, the court considers whether a firearm with a removed or altered serial number is within the meaning of “arms” in the Second Amendment, which depends on whether such firearms are “typically possessed or commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as self-defense.” Consistent with federal case law considering similar statutes, the Supreme Court finds that “firearms with obliterated, removed, changed, or altered serial numbers are not typically possessed or commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” and, therefore, they are not eligible for protection under the Second Amendment. Again, however, even if the Second Amendment protections applied, section 609.667(1) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Sections 624.713, subd. 1, and 609.667(1) do not facially violate the right to keep and bear arms. State v. Gaal, A24-0474, 2025 WL 1096240 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2025).

HOMICIDE: CRIMINAL VEHICULAR HOMICIDE FOR LEAVING THE SCENE DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF THE DEFENDANT WAS OPERATING THE MOTOR VEHICLE AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION

Appellant pleaded guilty to criminal vehicular homicide (CVH) after hitting a pedestrian with his motor vehicle and leaving the scene. During the plea colloquy, Appellant stated he suffered a “medical incident” and lost consciousness just before the collision. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

Appellant argues the CVH statute requires proof that he volitionally operated the motor vehicle at the time of the collision and, because he was unconscious at the time of the collision, the factual basis for his guilty plea was insufficient.

The Supreme Court holds that Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a) (CVO, leaving the scene), does not require any act of operation at the time of collision. The statute criminalizes causing the death of another as a result of operating a motor vehicle under certain conditions, including where the driver who caused the collision left the scene of the collision. Under the statutory language, the general event that must be caused “as a result of operating a motor vehicle” is the death of another, not the specific condition (such as a collision).

“As a result of” is not defined in the statute, but under commonly used definitions of the words, “an act of operation that takes place prior to a collision can satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)…” Appellant admitted when entering his guilty plea that he operated his motor vehicle until he lost consciousness, that his operation caused the pedestrian’s death, and that he left the scene and failed to return. His guilty plea was sufficient. State v. Brown, A23-0271, 19 N.W.3d 438 (Minn. Apr. 16, 2025).

RESTITUTION: PLEA AGREEMENT ITSELF DOES NOT WAIVE MANDATE TO CONSIDER A DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO PAY RESTITUTION

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and the district court ordered him to pay restitution to the victim’s mother and the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board(CVRB), finding that the payment of restitution was agreed to in the plea agreement, which waived Appellant’s right to assert an inability to pay.

Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1, requires the district court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of restitution, to consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim and the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant (“ability to pay”). The consideration of a defendant’s inability to pay is mandatory.

The Court of Appeals assumes without deciding that this mandatory statutory directive can be waived but finds no legal authority to support the conclusion that a plea agreement on its own can waive it. Here, the record does not show Appellant waived the requirement, as there are no facts showing he was aware of, understood, and agreed to waive the court’s obligation to consider his ability to pay. Thus, the district court was still obligated to consider Appellant’s ability to pay. Reversed and remanded. State v. Baker, A24-0910, 2025 WL 1153156 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2025).

ALTERNATE PERPEETRATOR: DISTRICT COURT MAY ALLOW A DEFENDANT TO CALL AN ALTERNATE PERPETRATOR AS A WITNESS FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ALTERNATE PERPETRATOR’S INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT AGAINST INCRIMINATION

Appellant was charged with second-degree intentional murder, but he claimed another person, R.J., was the perpetrator. The district court found he met the requirements to present an alternative perpetrator defense. Appellant sought to have R.J. testify at trial, but R.J. invoked his right against self-incrimination before trial began. The district court denied Appellant’s request that R.J. be required to invoke the right in the presence of the jury. Appellant was ultimately found guilty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

As an alternative perpetrator’s invocation of the right against self-incrimination on the witness stand may have probative value, the Supreme Court holds “that when a defendant has satisfied the required test to present an alternative perpetrator defense, the district court has discretion, subject to the ordinary rules of evidence, to allow the defendant to call the alternative perpetrator to the witness stand, even when it is known that the alternative perpetrator will invoke their right against compelled self-incrimination.”

This issue involves the interplay of multiple constitutional rights: the right to compulsory process, the right to present a complete defense, and the right against self-incrimination. The rights to compulsory process and to present a complete defense are not absolute and may sometimes bow to other legitimate interests, including the rules of evidence, particularly Minn. R. Evid. 402 and 403. The right against self-incrimination applies only when an accused is compelled to make an incriminating testimonial communication. Case law establishes that a defendant may not compel a witness to give incriminating answers, but it does not categorically prohibit a defendant from calling a witness who has invoked or intends to invoke the right against self-incrimination. Allowing a defendant to call such a witness has potential exculpatory effects, which implicates the defendant’s compulsory process and complete defense rights. An alternative perpetrator’s invocation of the right to remain silent, when taken in connection with other evidence, could in some circumstances support a logical inference by the jury as to the defendant’s guilt.

Importantly, “[t]he district court’s decision to allow an alternative perpetrator’s invocation of their right against self-incrimination on the witness stand must be a case-specific inquiry guided by the Minnesota Rules of Evidence.” The defendant must first satisfy the test for raising an alternative perpetrator defense, the district court must apply the ordinary rules of evidence, and the court must be mindful that the defense cannot compel a right-invoking witness to give incriminating testimony.

Here, the district court properly applied the rules of evidence, specifically Rule 403, when it denied Appellant’s request to require the alternative perpetrator to take the stand. State v. Foster, A21-0070, 20 N.W.3d 6 (Minn. Apr. 30, 2025).

INDECENT EXPOSURE: “LEWDLY” EXPOSING ONESELF REQUIRES ENGAGING IN CONDUCT OF A SEXUAL NATURE

After exposing her breasts in a gas station parking lot, Appellant was charged with misdemeanor indecent exposure for “willfully and lewdly” exposing her “body, or the private parts thereof,” under Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1). Appellant was ultimately convicted of the charge and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court court highlights Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1)’s requirement that the exposure of the body or private parts be lewd. Given that there was insufficient evidence that Appellant acted lewdly, the court declines to interpret the phrase “body, or the private parts thereof” or decide whether the statute violates equal protection.

In the indecent exposure statute context, “lewdly” is ambiguous. It is commonly defined in many different ways, including: “obscene,” “indecent,” “lustful,” and “of a sexual nature.” Looking to related statutes, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be obtained, and past versions of the statute, the court finds the most reasonable interpretation to be that “lewdly” refers to conduct “of a sexual nature.”

Appellant’s conduct was not “of a sexual nature.” The body worn camera footage of the incident did not show her engaging in any conduct of a sexual nature, nor did reports of prior exposure incidents reveal the nature of those exposures. She made comments revealing her subjective mental state at the time of the exposure, but the court finds this irrelevant to determine whether her conduct was of a sexual nature. Appellant’s conviction is reversed. State v. Plancarte, A23-0158, 20 N.W.3d 30 (Minn. Apr. 30, 2025).