February 2025 | Legal Case Updates | Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Sentencing, and Firearms

FOURTH AMENDMENT: NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN EMAILS SENT TO SCHOOL-OWNED EMAIL ACCOUNT AND RECEIVED ON PUBLIC SCHOOL’S SERVER

Appellant was charged with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct for exchanging emails with a 14-year-old student. His motion to suppress the emails was denied after the district court rejected his argument that the emails were discovered after a warrantless search by the student’s school via its use of a protective software scan. Appellant was convicted after a stipulated facts trial.

The student in question attended a public school that provided students with school email accounts. The school district used a software to screen all emails sent to and from the school emails. After an alert form the software, the district discovered the student in question was exchanging emails with an external email account that were sexual in nature and discussed drugs. The external email was found to belong to Appellant, a former student at the school.

The Court of Appeals finds that the district court did not err by concluding that the search of the emails Appellant sent to the student occurred after they were received on the school district’s server. The Court also determines Appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy or a property interest in the emails he sent to the student. Appellant relinquished control of his emails when they were successfully received on the school district’s server, so when the district searched the emails, they were not intruding upon private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Thus, there was no search for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Appellant also did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the emails. First, he did not exhibit a subjective expectation that the emails would remain private, because he emailed a student at her district-provided email address. When he received emails from her, the school-provided disclaimer in the emails notified him that the emails were monitored. Next, Appellant also did not have an objectively reasonable expectation that the emails would remain private. Appellant voluntarily turned over the information in the emails once he emailed them to a district-monitored email account. Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Gaul, A24-0555, 2025 WL 366059 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2025).

SIXTH AMENDMENT: RESTRICTING PUBLIC FROM THE COURTROOM EXCEPT BEFORE THE START OF EACH DAY’S PROCEEDINGS AND DURING BREAKS VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

Appellant went to trial on first-degree burglary, felony domestic assault, and DANCO violation charges. After the first two days of trial, the district court expressed concerns over members of the gallery coming and going from the courtroom with lay witnesses, which was not observed when law enforcement witnesses were testifying. The court ordered that only trial counsel and testifying witnesses were permitted to enter or re-enter the courtroom except in the morning before proceedings began and during planned breaks, to prevent the distractions. The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty on all charges, and he appealed, arguing the district court’s order restricting access to the courtroom deprived him of his right to a public trial.

The Court of Appeals first finds that the district court’s order constituted a true courtroom closure implicating Appellant’s constitutional public trial right. While closing a courtroom for discrete segments of trial does not implicate this right, the closure here was a “plenary restriction” on the entire public’s access to the courtroom for half of the trial, which included much of the State’s presentation, closing arguments, jury instructions, mistrial motion arguments, in-court review of evidence by the jury, and the return of the jury’s verdicts. Those already present in the courtroom when the closure began at the beginning of each day’s proceedings were permitted to stay, the remainder of the public was still excluded.

The Court next finds that the courtroom closure was not justified. Criminal proceedings have a presumption of openness, so the public trial right may give way to only those overriding interests based on specific findings that a closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Here, the district court believed the closure was necessary to prevent distractions to the jurors and court staff. However, the court was not avoiding likely disruptions, only trying to preempt possible future distractions. Some distraction is a natural consequence of an open courtroom, so the level of disturbance needed to justify a broad courtroom closure must be more than would be expected in a public trial proceeding. The record here does not show such a level of disturbance. Even if it did, the Court finds the district court’s broad closure order was not sufficiently tailored to address the risk and that the district court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives. The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. State v. Abukar, A24-0129, 16 N.W.3d 356 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2025).

SIXTH AMENDMENT: RIGHT TO CONFRONT A WITNESS AT TRIAL FOR OFFENSES AGAINST THAT WITNESS IS FORFEITED IF THE WITNESS WAS UNAVAILABLE AND THE DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY PROCURED THE UNAVAILABILITY BY WRONGDOING

Appellant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, first-degree burglary, second-degree assault, domestic assault by strangulation, and OFP violations. Prior to trial, Appellant repeatedly called the victim, C.G., from jail, threatening her and encouraging her to ask the State to dismiss the charges against him. C.G. subsequently told the State she wanted to recant her allegations. The State subpoenaed C.G. to testify at trial but she did not appear. The district court found Appellant had forfeited his right to confront C.G. and permitted the State to admit evidence regarding C.G.’s out-of-court statements. The jury found Appellant guilty of all charges, and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals notes that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, but that this right may be forfeited if a defendant intentionally procures a witness’ absence by wrongdoing. Hearsay is admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception. Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). The exception requires proof by the State, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: the declarant-witness is unavailable, the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct, the wrongful conduct procured the witness’ unavailability, and the defendant intended to procure the witness’ unavailability.

The Court finds Appellant engaged in wrongful conduct by contacting C.G. from jail, as each call was a DANCO violation and were threatening or coercive. The Court also finds that C.G. was unavailable, as she did not appear pursuant to a properly served subpoena, even after the State made repeated contact with her to discuss the case and to ensure her appearance. The State also tried to make additional contact with C.G. during trial, both directly and through others. C.G. did not appear for a prior hearing, stating she was afraid to do so. Thus, it was reasonable to infer C.G. would not appear at trial and the district court did not err in finding her unavailable.

The Court also determines the record contains ample circumstantial evidence showing C.G. failed to testify because she was afraid to do so after repeated threatening calls from Appellant, who was in jail for assaulting her. C.G.’s statements were consistent until this contact from Appellant. The district court did not err in finding Appellant’s wrongful conduct procured C.G.’s unavailability. The same is true of the district court’s finding that C.G.’s unavailability was Appellant’s intent. There is no reasonable interpretation of Appellant’s multiple calls to C.G. from jail other than that he sought to prevent C.G. from testifying against him. Therefore, Appellant forfeited his right to confront C.G. at trial.

The verdicts are not disturbed, but the case is remanded to correct the district court’s error in entering a conviction for the misdemeanor OFP violation, in addition to a felony OFP violation conviction, and the district court’s error in ordering a conditional release term for the first-degree burglary conviction, as there is no statutory authority for the court to do so. State v. Bellazan, A24-0416, 2025 WL 582797 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2025).

SENTENCING: PRIOR FELONY POINTS MAY BE ASSIGNED FOR AN OUT-OF-

STATE CONVICTION ONLY IF THE EQUIVALENT MINNESOTA OFFENSE IS A FELONY AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WOULD BE A FELONY-LEVEL SENTENCE IN MINNESOTA

When calculating Appellant’s sentence following his plea to aiding and abetting second-degree murder, the district court assigned a total of three criminal history points, one and one-half of which were prior felony points for a prior federal conviction. On appeal, Appellant argued these one and one-half points were improperly added, as the prior federal conviction was equivalent to a Minnesota gross misdemeanor. The Court of Appeals agrees, reversing and remanding for resentencing.

Non-Minnesota convictions may be included in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score, but the sentencing guidelines note that the sentencing court should find the equivalent Minnesota offense and should only count the non-Minnesota offense as a felony “if it would both be defined as a felony in Minnesota, and the offender received a sentence that in Minnesota would be a felony-level sentence.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines, § 2.B.5.b.

The district court assigned the one and one-half prior felony points for a 2017 federal conviction for engaging in a conspiracy to possess a firearm as a felon. The elements of this offense are equivalent to the Minnesota offense of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(10)(i) (possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year). The Minnesota offense is a gross misdemeanor, not a felony, as is the offense of engaging in a conspiracy to commit a violation of section 624.713, subd. 1(10)(i). Minn. Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2(3). Thus, Appellant’s prior federal conviction does not qualify as a prior felony under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. State v. Pruitt, A24-0240, 2025 WL 440121 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2025).

FIREARMS: “PUBLIC PLACE” INCLUDES THE INTERIOR OF A MOTOR VEHICLE ON A PUBLIC ROADWAY

After a traffic stop and search of Appellant’s vehicle, police found a BB gun under the driver’s seat and charged Appellant with carrying a BB gun in a public place. See Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subd. 2. The charge was dismissed for lack of probable cause after the district court found the interior of the motor vehicle was not a “public place.” The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court holds that “public place” includes the interior of a motor vehicle on a public roadway.

“Public place” as “property owned, leased, or controlled by a governmental unit and private property that is regularly and frequently open to or made available for use by the public in sufficient numbers to give clear notice of the property’s current dedication to public use.” Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subd. 1(c). It does not include “a person’s dwelling house or premises, the place of business owned or managed by the person, or the land possessed by the person; a gun show, gun show, or hunting or target shooting facility; or the woods, fields, or waters of this state where the person is present lawfully for the purpose of hunting or target shooting or other lawful activities involving firearms.” Id.

The Court looks to section 624.7181, subdivision 1(b)(5), which exempts from the definition of “carry” “the transporting of a BB gun, rifle, or shotgun in compliance with section 97B.045,” which contains certain requirements for transporting a firearm in a motor vehicle. If “public place” did not include the interior of a motor vehicle, this exemption would not be necessary. The inclusion of this exemption in the “carry” definition indicates that, in the absence of an exception, it may be unlawful to carry a firearm in a motor vehicle. The “public place” definition lists certain places that are not included, but the interior of a motor vehicle is not included. Moreover, the exemptions are all immovable structures or land, indicating that “public place” generally refers to geographic, rather than spatial, location. This would make the relevant “place” in Appellant’s case the roadway, not Appellant’s vehicle, and that roadway was public. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. State v. Bee, A23-1257, 2025 WL 542779 (Minn. Sup. Ct. Feb. 19, 2025).