January 2025 | Legal Case Updates | Domestic Assault, Controlled Substances, Implied Consent, and Criminal Procedure

DOMESTIC ASSAULT: “FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER” INCLUDES PERSONS INVOLVED IN A FORMER SIGNIFICANT ROMANTIC OR SEXUALRELATIONSHIP

After a court trial, Appellant was convicted of gross misdemeanor domestic assault and the Court of Appeals confirmed. The victim of Appellant’s offense was a woman with whom Appellant was in a romantic relationship that had ended by the time of the assault. Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to prove the woman was a “family or household member” because she was his former, not current, romantic partner.

Whoever assaults a “family or household member” is guilty of domestic assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1. “Family or household member” includes “persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship. Id. at § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(7). Other categories included in the “family or household member” definition refer to the past, but this specific category does not. However, in determining if a significant romantic or sexual relationship exists, the court may consider, among other factors, “if the relationship has terminated, length of time since the termination.” Id. at § 518B.01, subd. 2(b). Looking to the contemporaneous legislative history of the definition, the mischief the legislature sought to remedy, and the consequences of adopting an interpretation that would allow an individual avoid punishment by assaulting a former partner immediately after terminating a significant relationship, the Supreme Court finds that “involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship” may include both current and former relationships, subject to the application of the four statutory factors listed in section 518B.01, subd. 2(b).

The court also finds the evidence was sufficient for the factfinder to conclude that Appellant and his former partner were “involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.” State v. Latino, A23-0590, 2025 WL 45392 (Minn. Jan. 8, 2025).

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: ONE SYRINGE IS NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, “ONE DOSAGE UNIT”

Appellant entered a straight plea to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, admitting to possessing “a syringe containing 20 cc’s of” methamphetamine. A felony- level sentence was imposed, which expired in May 2018. Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence in February 2023, arguing it should have been a gross misdemeanor sentence because he only had “one dosage unit” of drugs “inside a single syringe.” The district court construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief and dismissed it as untimely. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to consider Appellant’s motion for correction of his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, on its merits. On remand, the court denied Appellant’s motion.

The Court of Appeals first finds the district court had jurisdiction to rule on Appellant’s motion. The district courts have original jurisdiction over the sentence imposed in a criminal case, and Rule 27.03, subd. 9, provides that a court may correct a sentence unauthorized by law at any time. The Court of Appeals holds that this includes even after a sentence has expired.

The Court of Appeals also finds that the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion. The controlled substance statute makes it a gross misdemeanor offense to possess “one dosage unit,” which Appellant argues includes the single syringe he possessed. However, after examining dictionary definitions of the terms, the court finds “dosage” refers to the quantity or amount of drug that is administered for a user to take at one time, and “unit” is the “single thing” that contains the drug the user consumes. At times, the “unit” may be a pill or a syringe. However, “dosage” modifies “unit” in the controlled substance statute. Under the statute, Appellant was required to prove he possessed the methamphetamine in one “unit” and that the one unit contained one “dose.” The court refuses to find that one syringe, as a matter of law, constitutes “one dosage unit.” “[T]he question of whether a syringe constitutes one dosage unit involves a fact-specific inquiry,” that “depends upon the size of the syringe, the amount of drugs inside the syringe, and the individual user.”

Appellant failed to present any evidence for this fact-specific inquiry, so the district court acted within its discretion by denying his Rule 27.03 motion. Mason v. State, A24-1074, 2025 WL 248768 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025).

IMPLIED CONSENT: DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW A REVOCATION EXTENSION

Appellant’s driver’s license was revoked under the implied consent law and he enrolled in the Ignition Interlock program. After not meeting the program requirements, the Commissioners of Public Safety extended his revocation period by 180 days, then for an additional year after continued program violations. Appellant filed a petition in the district court under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 challenging the extension. His petition was denied after the district court found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Minn. Stat. § 171.19 provides that “[a]ny person whose driver’s license has been refused, revoked, suspended, canceled, or disqualified by the commissioner… may file a petition for a hearing… in the district court… and it shall be its duty… to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license…” Appellant argues his revocation extension constitutes a “revocation” or “refusal” by the commissioner. The Court of Appeals disagrees.

“Revocation” is not defined by statute, but its dictionary “definitions connote an action that removes or restricts a status, privilege, or authorization.” The court holds that “revocation” in section 171.19 “plainly means the initial act or instance of withdrawing a person’s driver’s license” and does not include an extension of a revocation. “Refusal” is also not statutorily defined. However, its plain meaning “contemplates an action taken in response to a preceding request, application, or demand.” As a revocation extension does not arise from an application or request, it cannot be a refusal.

The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s petition. However, Appellant is permitted to seek administrative review of the revocation extension. Reihs v. Comm’r Pub. Safety, A24-0773, 2025 WL 249082 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: STATE MAY APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING APETITION TO VACATE A SECOND-DEGREE UNINTENTIONAL FELONY MURDER CONVICTION

Respondent pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree unintentional felony murder in 2013. He successfully petitioned the district court to vacate the conviction, pursuant to a new process enacted by the legislature in 2023 and 2024 for persons convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree unintentional felony murder to petition to have such convictions vacated. The district court then entered a conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree robbery, an offense charged in the original complaint but dismissed upon Respondent’s guilty plea. The State appealed as from an order granting postconviction relief.

The Court of Appeals holds that the State may appeal from an order granting vacatur of a conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree unintentional murder as a postconviction appeal. The court is informed by Raisch v. State, 8 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 2024), in which the court held a defendant may appeal a final order denying a preliminary application to file a petition seeking to vacate a conviction of aiding and abetting unintentional felony murder. While the State’s right to appeal is limited, the court notes that the criminal procedural rules and statutes provide the State a right to appeal an order granting postconviction relief. Vacating a second-degree unintentional felony murder conviction is within the scope of relief afforded a petitioner in the postconviction remedy statute. The State’s appeal is permitted to proceed. State v. Watson, A24-1469, 2025 WL 248843 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025).