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DATE: JULY 2018

I. INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS

A. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TOLLS 180-DAY SPEEDY TRIAL PERIOD: After being charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, he was detained in North Dakota and missed his Minnesota omnibus hearing. Appellant filed a Detainer Disposition Request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) to require the State to bring him to trial within 180 days. Appellant was transferred to Minnesota’s custody on August 17 and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause on October 23, which the court denied on December 5. Trial was set for January 9, but the complaint was dismissed at the January 4 settlement conference on the basis that more than 180 days had elapsed since the filing of the Detainer Disposition Request. The State appealed. Under the IAD, a prisoner “shall be brought to trial within 180 days” on any out-of-state charges after the prisoner sends to the official having custody over him “written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition.” The official must then forward the request to the out-of-state prosecuting officer. If the receiving court does not grant “any necessary or reasonable continuance” “for good cause shown,” failure to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days requires dismissal of the charge with prejudice. In this case of first impression, the Court of Appeals considers whether a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause tolls the 180-day period under the IAD. The Court refers to case law interpreting the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), which provides that a prisoner’s request for speedy disposition of his or her charges requires that the case be brought to trial within six months or the complaint is to be dismissed with prejudice. Those cases permit tolling of the statutory time limit when the defendant caused or created the delay, such as when the defendant files a motion to dismiss. Thus, the Court finds that the district court erred in finding Appellant’s speedy trial right under the IAD had been violated and should have excluded from its calculations the 42-day period between Appellant’s filing and the court’s resolution of the motion to dismiss. Excluding those 42 days, the IAD required Appellant to be brought to trial by February 12, well after the January 9 trial date. State v. Jeremy Brian Roy, No. A18-0054, N.W.2d , 2018 WL 3520543 (Minn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

II. JUVENILE

A. CONTINUANCE WITHOUT ADJUDICATION MAY BE EXTENDED UP TO AN ADDITIONAL 180 DAYS ONLY AFTER REVIEW HEARING: A juvenile pleaded guilty to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct and his case was continued without adjudication for two 180-day periods. The juvenile violated the terms of his probation and the district court revoked the stay and adjudicated him guilty. On appeal, the juvenile argues the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate him delinquent because the court continued the case for 360 days, without conducting a review after the first 180 days.
Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7(a), permits the court to stay adjudication of a juvenile case for 180 days, and to extend the continuance for one additional 180-day period, but only if the prosecutor consents and the court has reviewed the case and entered an order for the additional continuance. The district court here did not comply with the statute’s plain language. Requiring review of a juvenile’s case after 180 days “provides valuable means to intervene quickly to help a juvenile offender be successful in the community and to provide additional accountability measures before the juvenile’s problems escalate.” Additionally, the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure describe these statutory timeframe requirements as jurisdictional. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.04, subd. 4(F), and 15.05, subd. 4(B).
As the district court did not conduct a review of the juvenile’s case after the first 180-day continuance period, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider any probation violation or to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent after the first 180 days. Reversed and remanded to dismiss the probation violation petition against the juvenile. Matter of Welfare of C.S.N., No. A17-1736, N.W.2d , 2018 WL 3520982 (Minn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

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