July 2025 | Legal Case Updates | Criminal Procedure, Criminal Sexual Conduct, Tax Evasion and More

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: STATE’S RIGHT TO APPEAL PROBATION REVOCATION DECISION INCLUDES RIGHT TO APPEAL RELATED JAIL CREDIT DETERMINATION

Appellant’s probation was revoked and a stayed sentence was executed. The district court awarded Appellant full jail credit for time he spent in custody in Minnesota and partial credit for time in custody in North Dakota on unrelated charges while awaiting transfer to Minnesota. The State appealed the out-of-state custody credit and Appellant argued they had no right to appeal the jail credit determination. The Court of Appeals denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

The Supreme Court notes that Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(4)(a), allows both the defendant and prosecutor to appeal a probation revocation decision. Case law has interpreted this rule to allow the State to appeal a decision related to, but distinct from, the revocation of probation. The Court holds that “the State’s right to appeal a jail credit determination following a probation revocation decision arises by necessary implication from the State’s express right to appeal a ‘revocation decision’…”

The probation revocation procedure in Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04 requires the court, if probation is revoked and the probationer’s sentence is executed, to grant the probationer credit for prior imprisonment. Thus, the jail credit determination is “inextricably linked” to the revocation and sentence execution determination. The State’s appeal was properly allowed to proceed. State v. Johnson, A24-0245, 23 N.W.3d 70 (Minn. July 2, 2025).

CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT: FIRST-DEGREE CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT CRIMINALIZES THE USE OF FORCE BEFORE OR DURING AN ACT OF NONCONSENSUAL SEXUAL PENETRATION

The district court granted Appellant’s motion to dismiss a charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), for lack of probable cause on the grounds that insufficient facts were alleged to show Appellant used force to accomplish an act of sexual penetration. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Section 609.342, subd. 1(d) criminalizes nonconsensual penetration when “the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).” As applied in this case, “force” is defined as “the infliction by the actor of bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(1). The parties disagree on what the purpose of the force must be and when the force must be used. The Supreme Court finds that the plain language of section 609.342, subd. 1(d), “criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force either before or during act…”

While “force” is defined in the relevant statutes, “uses” is not. The court looks to other subsections of section 609.342, subdivision 1, which prohibit some acts, such as using a weapon, coercion, or force when aided and abetted by an accomplice, that cause a victim to submit to sexual penetration. Subdivision 1(d) does not, however, include similar causation language. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of “uses” in subdivision 1(d) is “to put into service” or “to employ.”

The court highlights that the phrase “uses force” is used to establish a circumstance, or “an event accompanying, conditioning or determining” the sexual penetration. Thus, “the plain language of the statute penalizes the use of force both before (‘conditioning or determining’) and during (‘accompanying’) the sexual penetration.”

The complaint and supplemental evidence alleged that the victim started bleeding vaginally after Appellant started sexually assaulting her, due to a rip in the victim’s vagina, and that the victim did not consent to the penetration. These facts were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe Appellant used force before or during his nonconsensual sexual penetration of the victim. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. State v. Letourneau, A24-0182, 23 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. July 9, 2025).

TAX EVASION: FELONY TAX EVASION DOES NOT REQUIRES PROOF OF AN ADDITIONAL EVASIVE ACT OTHER THAN FAILING TO PAY TAXES

The district court dismissed ten charges of felony tax evasion for lack of probable cause, finding there was no evidence Respondent did anything more than knowingly failing to file or pay taxes and that the law requires evidence to support a willful attempt to evade taxes. The State appealed.

Minn. Stat. § 289A.63, subd. 1, makes it a felony, (a) when required to file a return, report, or other document, to “willfully attempt[] in any manner to evade or defeat a tax by failing to file it when required,” or (b) when required to pay or to collect and remit a tax, to “willfully attempt[] to evade or defeat a tax law by failing to do so when required…” The Court of Appeals interprets the phrase “willfully attempts to evade or defeat a tax” from both types of felony tax evasion offenses.

“Willful” is not defined by statute, so the court looks to dictionary definitions, which indicate that the term “clearly contemplates deliberate, intentional conduct.” “Intentionally” is defined by statute to mean acting with “a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3). Thus, “willingly” in the tax evasion statute “means that the person knowingly failed to file a tax return or pay a required tax with the purpose to attempt to evade or defeat their tax obligation.” The phrase “willfully attempts to evade or defeat a tax” does not create an additional actus reus offense element, but instead simply distinguishes the required mens rea for a felony violation (willingly) from that required for a gross misdemeanor violation (knowledge).

Under this interpretation of section 289A.63, subd. 1, there was sufficient probable cause to support the charges against Respondent. State v. O’Day, A24-2009, 2025 WL 1921956 (Minn. Ct. App. July 14, 2025).

FOURTH AMENDMENT: WHETHER EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE FROM THE HOT PURSUIT OF A MISDEMEANOR SUSPECT DEPENDS ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

After she was charged with refusal to submit to chemical testing, the district court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop of her vehicle and the warrantless entry of her home. On the night of Appellant’s arrest, police observed Appellant’s vehicle cross the center line and initiated a traffic stop. Appellant pulled into an alley, and parked on a driveway behind her home. When the officer and Appellant exited their vehicles, Appellant exhibited indicia of intoxication. She agreed to take a PBT, but when the officer returned from retrieving PBT from his squad car, Appellant had walked away and entered her home. Appellant eventually slightly opened the door and officers entered the house. Appellant then refused a PBT and claimed she had been home all evening. Appellant was arrested and refused a breath test. Appellant was ultimately convicted after a stipulated evidence trial.

Here, the district court found, a finding supported by the record, that the arresting officer saw Appellant’s vehicle cross the center line and weave within the lane of traffic. Thus, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Appellant was driving while under the influence and the stop of Appellant’s vehicle was justified.

A warrantless entry of a home is presumptively unreasonable but may be reasonable if the officer had probable cause to conduct a search or seizure and makes entry pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement. Here, the officers had probable cause to arrest Appellant for DWI when they entered her home, based on their observations of her intoxication and driving conduct.

The warrantless entry of Appellant’s home to effectuate her arrest was also justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Exigent circumstances can include the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. If the fleeing individual is suspected of a misdemeanor, the Court of Appeals holds that a case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is required of “the nature of the crime, the nature of the flight, and surrounding facts,” including “imminent harm to others, a threat to the officer himself, destruction of evidence, [and] escape from the home.”

Here, Appellant was suspected of DWI, an offense that could be a misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony. Appellant’s arrest was set in motion in a public place, Appellant fled in a deliberate and calculated manner, and she was very shortly thereafter pursued by police. If the police did not enter Appellant’s home to arrest her, they risked the destruction of evidence. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. State v. Mangen, A24-1689, 2025 WL 1921900 (Minn. Ct. App. July 14, 2025).

EVIDENCE: A CONFESSION IS SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED FOR BOTH COMPLETED AND ATTEMPTED OFFENSES BY INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE REASONABLY TENDING TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE

After confessing that he planned to rape a woman he had isolated and physically attacked, Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing personal injury using force or coercion. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, for attempted crimes, the corpus delicti statute requires independent evidence of both a defendant’s intent and a substantial step and that there was no evidence independent of Appellant’s confession of a substantial step toward committing the offense.

Minn. Stat. § 634.03 codifies the corpus delicti rule and provides that “[a] confession of a defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense charged has been committed.” The Minnesota Supreme Court previously interpreted the statute to require “the State to present evidence independent of a confession that reasonably tends to prove that the specific crime charged in the complaint actually occurred.” State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803, 814 (Minn. 2021). The Court confirms that the requirement of “independent evidence that reasonably tends to prove the defendant committed the charged offense” applies to both completed and attempted crimes. This requirement does not mandate corroborating evidence for each individual element of the underlying offense and it may be satisfied with circumstantial evidence.

Attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing personal injury using force or coercion requires the State to prove that the “defendant intended to sexually penetrate a nonconsenting complainant causing personal injury using force or coercion, and that the defendant took a substantial step toward committing that crime.” It is reasonable to infer from the State’s evidence in this case that Appellant intended to sexually penetrate the victim without consent and that he took a substantial step toward committing the offense. Thus, the State satisfied its burden of establishing corpus delicti and the Court of Appeals is reversed. State v. Hill, A23-0560, 23 N.W.3d 824 (Minn. July 23, 2023).

FELONY MURDER: DENIAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR RELIEF UNDER ACT ALLOWING FOR CHALLENGES OF CERTAIN FELONY MURDER CONVICTIONS IS REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Appellant was convicted in 2014 of felony murder. In 2023, the legislature promulgated an act (“Act”) establishing a pathway whereby those convicted of first-degree felony murder on “an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability could have their sentence vacated if they can show that they neither caused the death of a human being nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, conspired with, or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause such a death.” The district court denied Appellant’s preliminary application for relief under the Act.

In this first appeal under the Act, the Supreme Court concludes that the appropriate standard of review for decisions under the Act is abuse of discretion. The plain language of the Act directs the district court to “determine whether, in the discretion of that judge, there is a reasonable probability that the application is entitled to relief under” the Act. The Court has also previously held that an appeal of a denial under the Act could proceed under Minn. R. Crim. P. 29 and should be treated as a denial of a petition for postconviction relief. Such denials are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s preliminary application. The facts in the record support a reasonable inference that Appellant shot the victim with an intent to kill him. Thus, Appellant’s preliminary application does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that he is entitled to relief under the Act. State v. Griffin, A24-0859, 24 N.W.3d 247 (Minn. July 30, 2025).