July 2026 | Legal Case Updates | Jury Instructions, Felony Murder & Controlled Substances

JURY INSTRUCTIONS: SPECIFIC UNANIMITY IS REQUIRED WHEN A DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH ONE COUNT BUT THE STATE PRESENTS EVIDENCE OF MORE THAN ON DISTINCT ACT, EACH OF WHICH COULD PROVE THE OFFENSE ELEMENTS

Appellant was tried on charges including first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the victim testified that Appellant committed two distinct acts of nonconsensual sexual penetration. The State’s theory was that the entire incident, both instances of sexual penetration, satisfied the elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for a jury instruction stating that unanimous agreement was required as to which specific act of penetration satisfied the offense. Appellant was convicted and he appealed, arguing the denied jury instruction deprived him of his right to a unanimous jury verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

A unanimous verdict is required under the federal and state constitutions and under Minnesota’s criminal procedural rules. The Supreme Court holds that when the State charges one crime but alleges multiple distinct acts, each of which on its own could satisfy the offense elements, the defendant is entitled to a specific-unanimity instruction advising the jury they must unanimously agree as to the specific act that proves the elements of the charged offense.

The court rejects the Court of Appeals’ single behavioral incident approach to determining whether a specific-unanimity instruction is required. Consistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law, the court adopts the following analytical framework: (1) examine the criminal statute to identify the offense elements and distinguish any statutory means for committing the elements; (2) consider the facts alleged by the State to prove a violation, inquiring into whether the State alleged a single act to satisfy the elements of the statute or multiple distinct acts, each of which on its own could satisfy the elements of the statute. If the State alleged multiple distinct acts, the jury must decide which act satisfies the offense elements.

Applying this framework to Appellant’s case, the court finds the district court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s specific-unanimity instruction request. The relevant elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct are: (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration, including sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse, and (2) without the complainant’s consent. The State charged Appellant for engaging in nonconsensual fellatio. At trial, the State presented evidence of two distinct acts of nonconsensual fellatio, both of which could have proved the elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct as charged. Thus, the district court should have instructed the jury that they must unanimously agree as to which of the two acts Appellant committed. The error implicated Appellant’s constitutional right and the court finds it was not harmless, requiring reversal of Appellant’s conviction. State v. Keyes, A23-1400, 2026 WL 2053029 (Minn. July 22, 2026).

The Supreme Court applied Keyes in State v. Yang. In Yang, Appellant was charged with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct based on allegations of multiple instances sexual misconduct involving his stepchild. Appellant did not request a specific-unanimity instruction, and the jury was generally instructed that their verdict must be unanimous. The jury found Appellant guilty of both offenses, and he was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He appealed, arguing the district court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific- unanimity jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

The Supreme Court applies the specific-unanimity instruction framework set forth in State v. Keyes, A23-1400, 2026 WL 2053029 (Minn. July 22, 2026), finding Appellant was entitled to a specific-unanimity instruction and the failure to provide one was plain error. Appellant was charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, which, as charged, includes the following elements: (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration, including sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse, with the complainant; (2) the defendant had a significant relationship to the complainant; and (3) the complainant was under the age of 16 years at the time of the sexual penetration. At trial, the State presented evidence of multiple acts of cunnilingus and fellatio involving his stepdaughter, who was under the age of 16 at the time of the acts, on different days and in different locations over a two-year period. Thus, the State alleged multiple distinct acts of sexual penetration, each of which on their own could have proved the elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, entitling Appellant to an instruction that the jury was required to unanimously agree which specific penetrative act the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court explicitly overrules State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), as inconsistent with Keyes. Rucker held that specific unanimity is not required for “examples” of an act, distinguishing between “distinct allegations” and mere “examples” of abuse. Id. at 548. The court emphasizes that where multiple distinct acts are alleged, and each act on its own could prove the charged offense elements, specific unanimity is required of the jury.

As the district court erred and the error was plain, Appellant’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. State v. Yang, A24-0228, 2026 WL 2104912 (Minn. July 26, 2026).

FELONY MURDER: ERROR TO DENY PETITION TO VACATE FELONY MURDER CONVICTION BASED ON CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS MADE WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING

Appellant pleaded guilty in 2017 to first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of liability. He later petitioned the district court to vacate his conviction under the act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (“the Act”), which provides a pathway to possible relief for those convicted of first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of liability “if they show by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not cause the death of a human being and did not intentionally aid, advise, hire, counsel, or conspire with or otherwise procure another with intent to cause the death of a human being.” An evidentiary hearing was not held, but the district court denied Appellant’s petition, relying on transcripts and findings in a co-conspirator’s to conclude that Appellant was not entitled to relief because he “did in fact cause the death of [the victim].”

The Supreme Court first holds that a district court’s denial of a petition under the Act without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The court has previously held that, in considering a request for relief under the Act, a district court may not make credibility determinations without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Implicit in the district court’s finding that Appellant caused the victim’s death was a determination that his claim in his petition that he was not present for the fatal shooting was not credible. The dispute surrounding this material fact should have been resolved through an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Patterson v. State, A25-0541, 2026 WL 2104932 (Minn. July 22, 2026).

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FIRST-DEGREE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE SALE REQUIRES PROOF THE DEFENDANT KNEW THE CONSPIRACY INVOLVED CONTROLLED SUSBTANCES AT OR ABOVE THE RELEVANT STATUTORY WEIGHT

At the conclusion of Appellant’s trial on various controlled substance charges, including conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of controlled substances, the State told the jury in its closing argument that it did not need to prove Appellant knew the conspiracy involved more than fifty grams of fentanyl (the statutory weight requirement for a first-degree offense at that time).

The Supreme Court first examines the elements of conspiracy to commit first-degree controlled substance sale, noting that the State must prove (1) an agreement between two or more people to commit first-degree controlled substance sale, (2) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) a conscious and intentional purpose to break the law, which requires both knowledge of an agreement and evidence of intent to commit a first-degree controlled substance sale. The jury was thus required to find Appellant intended to commit each of these elements, including every element of the underlying first-degree controlled substance offense. Under the facts of Appellant’s case, before the jury could find Appellant guilty of conspiracy, it had to first find that he and a co-conspirator agreed to (1) an unlawful sale or sales; (2) on one or more occasions within a 90-day period; (3) of one or more mixtures weighing at least 50 grams and containing fentanyl; (4) which Appellant knew or believed contain fentanyl. Thus, the State was wrong in its closing argument, and the jury did have to find Appellant intended a sale of a mixture containing fentanyl that weighed at least 50 grams.

Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2, the expansive liability provision of the accomplice liability statute, provides that once a defendant is liable for a crime of another person, they may also be liable for additional crimes “if reasonably foreseeable… as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.” Even if the State’s theory fell within the expansive liability statute, the State had to prove more than just that a conspiracy existed and that the conspiracy involved more than 50 grams, as the State argued in closing. The jury would also have to find “that it would have been reasonably foreseeable to someone in [Appellant’s] position that a first-degree controlled substance conspiracy was a probable consequence of whatever other controlled substance crime [Appellant] conspired to commit.” Thus, the State’s statement during closing was also inaccurate under section 609.05, subd. 2.

Appellant did not object to the State’s erroneous statement at trial, but the court finds the error was plain, as it contravened case and statutory law, and that the error was not harmless. Appellant’s convictions are reversed. State v. Ahmed, A24-0037, 2026 WL 2177454 (Minn. July 29, 2026).