March 2026 | Legal Case Updates | Venue, Criminal Damage to Property, Privilege, Right to Counsel & More

VENUE: PAULSON HOLDING THAT VENUE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE IS NOT LIMITED TO CASES INVOLVING GUILTY PLEAS

After a trial on stipulated facts, Appellant was convicted of three counts of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. His conviction on one count was reversed on appeal, after the Court of Appeals found that venue was an essential element of the offense and that the State failed to prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for further review and stayed the case pending its decision in State v. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144 (Minn. 2025). The Supreme Court held in Paulson that the statutory venue requirement in Minn. Stat. § 627.01 is not an element of an offense and upheld a guilty plea despite the factual basis for the plea not establishing the venue requirement. Appellant’s case was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals holds that the statutory venue requirement is not an element of a criminal offense even in cases that proceed to trial. Paulson did not limit expressly limit its holding to cases involving guilty pleas. Applying Paulson to Appellant’s case also does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, as Paulson did not substantively change the elements of any criminal offense but merely clarified that the statutory venue requirement is not an element of criminal offenses. Appellant’s convictions are affirmed. State v. Anderson, A23-0613, 2026 WL 569820 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2026).

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY: FOR FIRST-DEGREE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY THAT REDUCES THE PROPERTY’S VALUE BY MORE THAN $1,000, THE VALUE OF ANY PROPERTY DAMAGED WITHIN ANY SIX-MONTH PERIOD MAY BE AGGREGATED IF THE ALLEGED REDUCTION IN VALUE OF EACH OFFENSE IS GREATER THAN $1,000

Appellant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal damage to property under Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4), for twice striking and cracking cell door windows while he was incarcerated at the Itasca County jail, causing $1,020 in damage the first time and $1,000 the second. The incidents occurred approximately three months apart, but the State was permitted to aggregate the two offenses. Appellant was convicted of the aggregated offense after a jury trial.

The Court of Appeals notes that Minn. Stat. § 595.01, subd. 1, specifically provides that “[i]n any prosecution under clause (4), the value of any property damaged by the defendant in violation of that clause within any six-month period may be aggregated…” (emphasis added). The court finds the only reasonable interpretation of the italicized phrase to be that it is referencing Minn. Stat. § 595.01, subd. 1(4)—that is, each offense must allege a reduction in the value of the property by more than $1,000.

Here, the second offense did not allege a reduction in the value of the property of more than $1,000, so the district court erred when it granted the State’s motion to aggregate the two offenses. This error prejudiced because it allowed the State to prosecute the second offense under the first-degree criminal damage to property statute without proving the required damage threshold. Appellant’s conviction is reversed. State v. Lanham, A25-0516, 2026 WL 648324 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2026).

PRIVILEGE: PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE PROTECTS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN A PATIENT AND A PARAMEDIC ONLY IF THE PARAMEDIC IS ACTING UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A TREATING PHYSICIAN

After being charged with driving under the influence of a controlled substance, Appellant moved to suppress his medical records and ambulance run sheets on grounds of privilege. The district court refused to suppress Appellant’s statements to paramedics or his girlfriend which she shared with a nurse. Appellant was convicted after a jury trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, adopting a categorical rule excluding paramedics from the physician-patient privilege.

The Supreme Court affirms, but on different grounds. The court rejects the Court of Appeals’ categorical rule excluding paramedics from the physician-patient privilege in Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d). The court previously held in State v. Staat, 192 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Minn. 1971), that the privilege extends to employees or those acting under the direction of the physician examining or treating a patient. There may be situations in which a paramedic is acting under a treating physician’s direction. In those situations, the patient’s communications with the paramedic are protected by the physician-patient privilege.

Here, however, Appellant failed to establish that the paramedics were acting under the direction of Appellant’s physician when they examined Appellant. Thus, the physician-patient privilege did not protect Appellant’s statements to the paramedics.

Appellant’s statements to his girlfriend, which she shared with a nurse, were also not protected by the privilege. Appellant was conscious and interacting with hospital staff at the time, and his girlfriend was, therefore, not necessary to his treatment.

The court also rejects Appellant’s argument that the statements in question became privileged when they became part of his written medical records and were transmitted to or acquired by his healthcare provider. The inclusion of nonprivileged statements in Appellant’s medical record does not render the statements privileged.

Lastly, the court holds that the physician-patient privilege statute does not prohibit the issuance of “a warrant authorizing a particularized search of a criminal suspect’s medical records where the suspect was injured at the scene of a traffic accident.” Unlike the sexual assault counselor privilege in Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k), which protects the entirety of a victim’s sexual assault counselor records and does not permit disclosure of privileged records in a legal proceeding without the victim’s consent, the physician-patient privilege protects only specific information in a patient’s record from disclosure by the physician. Not only is the scope of the physician-patient privilege statute narrower, but the court has also recognized exceptions to the general rule that written medical records are protected by the physician-patient privilege. State v. Smeby, A23-0516, 2026 WL 759064 (Minn. Mar. 18, 2026).

RIGHT TO COUNSEL: DE NOVO REVIEW APPLIES TO A DISTRICT COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VALID, BUT UNDERLYING FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE REVIEWIED FOR CLEAR ERROR

Appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree domestic assault murder, arguing he did not validly waive his right to counsel. He was initially charged with second-degree murder when he first waived his right to counsel. After being indicted for first-degree murder, he again waived the right, proceeded pro se at a trial on stipulated facts and evidence, and was ultimately convicted. On appeal, he argues his initial and renewed waivers were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

The Supreme Court first clarifies the standard of review for claims of an invalid waiver of the right to counsel, noting that it requires the application of both the de novo and clear error standards. The waiver determination requires the district court to make factual findings, as whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. A district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. However, after these factual findings are made, the district court must also decide as a matter of law whether the defendant’s waiver was valid. This legal question is reviewed de novo.

The court finds that Appellant’s initial waiver of his right to counsel and his post-indictment renewed waiver were both constitutionally valid. His conviction is affirmed. State v. Turner, A24-1173, 2026 WL 758996 (Minn. Mar. 18, 2026).

AIDING AND ABETTING INTENTIONAL FELONY MURDER: FIRST-TIME PRELIMINARY APPLICATION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE ACT OF MAY 19, 2023, MAY BE SUMMARILY DENIED ONLY FOR REASONS LISTED IN THE ACT

Appellant was convicted in 2021 of aiding and abetting first-degree felony murder. At that time, the State needed to prove only that Appellant’s accomplice intended to cause the death of another while committing a felony, that Appellant intentionally aided her accomplice in committing the underlying felony, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that a person would die as a probable consequence of committing the underlying felony.

In the Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (“the Act”), the felony murder statutes were amended to “create[] an exception to the expansive liability rule for intentional felony murder convictions such that a person can be convicted of first-degree felony murder ‘for a death caused by another’ only ‘if the person intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other with the intent to cause the death of a human being.’” The Act also create a pathway to apply for limited relief for individuals convicted of first-degree or second-degree intentional felony murder under an aiding- and-abetting theory of liability. The application may be summarily denied for reasons listed in subdivision 5(e)-(f) of the Act.

Appellant’s preliminary application for relief under the Act was summarily denied by the district court. Focusing on subdivision 5(e) of the Act, which applies to first-time preliminary applications, the Supreme Court notes that the legislature was very specific in the inclusion of a list of reasons why a preliminary application may be summarily denied, indicating the legislature omitted other grounds by deliberate choice. Thus, the court holds “that a reviewing judge may not summarily deny a first-time preliminary application for a reason other than those enumerated in subdivision 5(e).” The district court’s stated reason for denying Appellant’s application was not one enumerated in subdivision 5(e), the district court abused its discretion.

The court also considers the meaning of the Act’s requirement that, upon receipt of a preliminary application, the district court must determine whether there is a “reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief” under the Act. The court finds this phrase, in the first-degree felony murder context, means that a preliminary application “must allege facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither caused nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause the death of a human being.”

In considering a request for relief under the Act, the court also clarifies that the district court cannot make credibility determinations without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant’s preliminary application satisfied the “reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief” standard. The denial of her preliminary application is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. State v. Zielinksi, A24-1837, 2026 WL 817036 (Minn. Mar. 25, 2026).