May 2024

PROBATION: DISTRICT COURT MAY GRANT DEMAND TO EXECUTE A SENTENCE EVEN IF THE PROBATIONARY TERMS ARE LESS ONEROUS

Appellant received stayed sentences on two DWI cases from two counties and was placed on probation for each. Upon his second probation violation, both district courts granted Appellant’s demands to execute his sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues the district courts erred in granting his demands as the terms of the probationary sentences were less onerous than the conditions of the executed sentences. The Court of Appeals first determines the proper standard of review is plain error, as Appellant invited the claimed errors made by the district courts.

Next the court finds the district courts did not commit plain error here, because, as a threshold matter, Appellant failed to establish that the district courts made any errors at all. Prior case law established that a defendant has a right to demand execution of a presumptive sentence when the probationary sentence is more onerous. However, this rule does not prohibit a district court from granting a demand to execute a sentence that carries more onerous conditions than a probationary sentence. The district courts are affirmed. State v. Bogonko, A23-1342, A23-1547, 6 N.W.3d 481 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2024).

IMMUNITY: GOOD SAMARITAN OVERDOSE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT PROVIDES IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION FOR ONE WHO ACTS IN GOOD FAITH WHEN SEEKING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

Appellant was convicted of two counts of fifth-degree controlled substance crimes but argues on appeal that he was immune from prosecution under the Minnesota Good Samaritan overdose medical assistance act (MSGA). The district court held Appellant failed to satisfy the good faith requirement of the MGSA and rejected Appellant’s request to submit the immunity claim to the jury as an affirmative defense. While the Court of Appeals agrees that the MSGA provides immunity from prosecution, not an affirmative defense, the court reverses the district court’s immunity decision.

Appellant called 911 to report his friend was “blue” and not breathing. While waiting for police, Appellant attempted CPR. He met police at the door and helped them move his friend from the couch to the floor. He also answered questions posed by police and told them his friend had consumed alcohol and cocaine. Marijuana and a compound containing heroin and fentanyl were later found in Appellant’s truck. His friend’s autopsy revealed he had died from the effects of fentanyl, heroin, ethanol, and cocaine.

The MSGA provides that “[a] person acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance for another person who is experiencing a drug-related overdose may not be charged or prosecuted for the possession, sharing, or use of a controlled substance…, or possession of drug paraphernalia,” if “(1) the evidence for the charge or prosecution was obtained as a result of the person’s seeking medical assistance for another persons; and (2) the person seeks medical assistance for another person who is in need of medical assistance for an immediate health or safety concern, provided that the person who seeks the medical assistance is the first person to seek the assistance, provides a name and contact information, remains on the scene until assistance arrives or is provided, and cooperates with the authorities.” Minn. Stat. § 604A.05, subd. 1.

The district court found Appellant did not act in good faith because he delayed telling police that his friend had ingested cocaine until specifically asked about drug use, did not share the extreme amount of alcohol consumed until after his friend had already died, and did not mention the potential that his friend had ingested heroin.

The Court of Appeals holds that the MSGA’s use of the phrase “may not be charged or prosecuted” clearly indicates that it establishes an immunity, rather than an affirmative defense. The question turns, then, to whether Appellant acted in good faith and whether he cooperated with authorities. The court agrees with Appellant’s argument that the “good faith” requirement applies only to the act of seeking medical assistance, and not to any other requirements of the MSGA. “A person acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance” is interpreted by the court to mean “a person acting with an honesty in belief or purpose who tries to locate medical assistance.” The phrase does not, as the district court held, require the immediate disclosure of all known or possibly known intoxicants ingested by the overdose victim.

The court also holds that “acting in good faith” does not also modify the cooperation requirement of the MSGA. The criteria in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of Minn. Stat. § 604A.05, subd. 1, including the duty to cooperate, “are to be judged objectively, independent of the subjective lens of whether the defendant was acting in good faith.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. State v. Borquist, A23-0685, 7 N.W.3d 145 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2024).

EVIDENCE: DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF ANONYMOUS, THREATENING PHONE CALLS TO A WITNESS

Appellant was convicted of second-degree unintentional murder after he struck the victim with a car victim following an interaction at a bar earlier that night. At trial, the district court permitted the State to question the victim’s friend, B.A., who was present when the victim was struck, about multiple threatening phone calls from unknown callers, finding the evidence probative of B.A.’s credibility. B.A. testified he had no reason to believe the calls were from Appellant but that the calls told him not to testify. The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction. The Supreme Court finds that the threatening phone call evidence’s potential for unfair prejudice to Appellant substantially outweighed any probative value. However, Appellant’s conviction is affirmed, as there is no reasonable probability the evidence significantly impacted the jury’s verdict.

The court notes that, in prior cases upholding the admission of threat evidence, the evidence was elicited to explain inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony or the witness’s reluctance to testify. The record here does not show either with respect to B.A., making the probative value of the phone calls minimal. It is also well established that threat evidence may be extremely prejudicial, as it carries the potential for the jury to wrongly assume the defendant or his associates made the threats. This risk was not mitigated in Appellant’s case.

The district court’s error in admitting the threat evidence, however, was harmless. The evidence was only briefly presented to the jury, was not mentioned more than once by the State, and was vague. B.A. was also thoroughly cross-examined by Appellant’s counsel. Moreover, the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong. Affirmed. State v. Maye, A22-0316, 6 N.W.3d 103 (Minn. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2024).

EVIDENCE: ALTERNATE PERPETRATOR EVIDENCE MUST BE ALLOWED WHERE THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY HAS AN INHERENT TENDENCY TO CONNECT THE ALTERNATE PERPETRATOR TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME

Appellant was found guilty of the first-degree murder of N.D. in 1986. B.E., who had a sexual relationship with N.D., was initially the primary focus of the investigation. The BCA determined B.E. was a potential source of pubic hairs found in N.D.’s bedroom. In 2019, DNA from the crime scene, including semen and N.D.’s fingernail scrapings, was analyzed. Appellant was identified as the likely source of the DNA found at the scene. Later samples from Appellant matched the crime scene DNA profile. He was indicted for first-degree murder. He moved to admit evidence that B.E. was an alternate perpetrator and to suppressed evidence of his DNA analysis. Both motions were denied.

Under State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn. 1977), alternate perpetrator evidence is admissible if (1) the defendant proffers foundational evidence that has an inherent tendency to connect the alternate perpetrator with the actual commission of the crime, and (2) the evidence satisfies the ordinary rules of evidence. The Supreme Court finds the district court erred in excluding the alternate perpetrator evidence due to the evidence showing B.E. was with the victim the night she was killed, B.E. drove a vehicle physically consistent with one seen in the victim’s driveway when screaming was heard from her house, pubic hair at the scene could have come from B.E., and B.E. told police during an interview he often wondered if he woke in the middle of the night and killed the victim without remembering. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy the first step of the Hawkins test. The court emphasizes that this test does not require establishing a definite and unequivocal connection to the crime, but instead requires an inherent tendency to create a connection.

Not only did the district court err in excluding the alternate perpetrator evidence, but this error was also not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury had heard this evidence, the court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict. Reversed and remanded. State v. Carbo, A22-1823, 6 N.W.3d 114 (Minn. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2024).

FOURTH AMENDMENT: PROCEDURAL ADOPTED TO SAFEGUARD PRIVILEGED MATERIALS DURING THE SEARCH OF A LAW OFFICE OF AN ATTORNEY SUSPECTED OF A CRIME

During an investigation into alleged theft by Appellant, an attorney, from a client, police searched Appellant’s law office and electronic devices seized from her office. Appellant was convicted of theft by swindle. The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction. She argues before the Supreme Court that the warrants to search her office and electronic devices were insufficiently particular and the execution of the warrants was unconstitutionally unreasonable because the police did not safeguard attorney-client and work product privileges.

The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts that the warrants were sufficiently particular, so the Court of Appeals is affirmed. However, the court takes this opportunity to exercise its supervisory authority to establish rules governing searches of the offices of attorneys suspected of crimes in order to safeguard attorney-client privileged material. The court has previously held that documents from an attorney’s office must be obtained via a subpoena duces tecum, rather than a warrant, where the attorney is not the target of the investigation. The court determines that a subpoena is not appropriate when the attorney is the target.

The court holds that all documents obtained from the search of a law officer are presumed privileged and the State carries the burden of proving they are neither privileged nor work product. The court emphasizes that initial review of files should be as limited as possible during the search process, that the initial screening for privilege and work product must be completed by an entity other than the investigation and prosecution team, and that the State must take precautions regarding data access and retention for evidence obtained in the search of a law office. These rules apply prospectively.

Although these safeguards may not have been followed in this case, the court finds the potential error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt independent of any evidence seized from Appellant’s office. State v. Mcneilly, A22-0468, 6 N.W.3d 161 (Minn. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2024).

PROCEDURE: NO VIOLATION OF THE UMDDA TO CONTINUE TRIAL BEYOND STATUTORY SIX-MONTH PERIOD FOR GOOD CAUSE

After being charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Appellant made a formal request under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA) for his trial to commence within six months. The request was filed March 8, 2021. Thereafter, Appellant changed counsel multiple times. On August 16, 2021, the district court found good cause under the UMDDA to begin trial in October, beyond the UMDDA’s six-month period. Specifically, the court found the delay was necessary to allow defense counsel to prepare for trial. Ultimately, a jury found Appellant guilty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The UMDDA takes jurisdiction to hear a case from the district court if a trial does not begin by a required date. The Act requires a trial to occur “[w]ithin six months after the receipt of the request… or within such additional time as the court for good cause shown in open court may grant…” Minn. Stat. § 629.292. Here, the district court found good cause for a continuance on the record at the August 16th hearing and the delay, approximately one month beyond the Act’s deadline, was reasonable. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. State v. Letourneau, A22-0570, 6 N.W.3d 73 (Minn. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2024).

MINNESOTA IMPRISONMENT AND EXONERATION REMEDIES ACT (MIERA): PETITIONER IS NOT EXONERATED IF A CONVICTION IS REVERSED BECAUSE EVIDENCE FROM AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED

Appellant’s conviction for drug possession was reversed on appeal after the court found a search that revealed the drugs in his pocket violated the constitution and that the drugs should have been suppressed. The district court thereafter denied Appellant’s petition for an order declaring him eligible for compensation under the MIERA.

A petitioner may be entitled to compensation under the MIERA if they were exonerated. Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-.368. “Exonerated” is defined in section 590.11 and, as is relevant here, means that a court “reversed” the conviction “on grounds consistent with innocence.” “Grounds consistent with innocence” means the petitioner was exonerated through a pardon or commutation based on factual innocence or exonerated because their conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial ordered, and there is evidence of factual innocence. Here, Appellant’s conviction was reversed but not because of his factual innocence – “the reversal was based on an issue of legal significance.” He was not, therefore, exonerated for purposes of the MIERA. Aery v. State, A23-1329, 2024 WL 2264166 (Minn. Ct. App. May 20, 2024).

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: WITNESS IS NOT UNAVAILABLE IF THEY COULD HAVE TESTIFIED AT SOME POINT DURING TRIAL

Respondent’s first trial for second-degree unintentional felony murder ended in a mistrial. A State witness was potentially exposed to COVID at the time of the second trial. The district court found the witness was unavailable and allowed the transcript of her testimony to be read into the record during the second trial. Respondent was found guilty after the second trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that potential exposure to COVID-19 did not make the witness unavailable.

The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant’s face-to-face meeting with witnesses against him or her. However, where a witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, in-person testimony may not be required. Here, the witness was subject to cross-examination during her testimony at the first trial, but the Supreme Court finds she was not unavailable. The State bears the burden of proving a witness is unavailable and must make good faith efforts to obtain the witness’s presence at trial. The court holds that a witness’s unavailability must be assessed throughout trial – that is, the “district court should consider not only whether the witness is unavailable on the day that the State desires to call the witness, but also whether the witness will be unavailable at any reasonable point in time during the trial…”

Here, the witness was exposed to COVID-19, but the record does not show if she ever tested positive. The district court never inquired into the witness’s symptoms, level of contact with the COVID-positive individual, etc., and county public health officials advised the witness could appear at trial with certain precautions. The State failed to prove witness was unavailable for the entirety of trial, that she could not testify at any point during trial, and the district court’s finding that she was unavailable was error. However, the court holds that the the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Trifiletti, A21-1101, 6 N.W.3d 79 (Minn. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2024).