May 2025 | Legal Case Updates | 4th Amendment, Implied Consent and Sentencing

FOURTH AMENDMENT: ODOR OF MARIJUANA IN A VEHICLE DOES NOT ON ITS OWN PROVIDE A REASONABLE, SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Appellant’s vehicle was stopped for an equipment violation. When a deputy approached the vehicle, nothing illegal was noted inside nor were any signs of impairment observed. The deputy told a sergeant also at the scene he may have smelled the odor of marijuana inside the vehicle. The sergeant reapproached the vehicle and reported smelling the odor of marijuana from inside the vehicle and that Appellant had dilated pupils and glossy eyes. Appellant was asked to exit the vehicle, was questioned, and performed field sobriety tests. A search warrant was obtained, and a sample of Appellant’s blood was taken, which later showed the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine. Appellant was found guilty of driving with a controlled substance in his body.

Appellant challenges on appeal whether the odor of marijuana, on its own, provided sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope of the equipment violation stop. Appellant was lawfully seized initially due to his vehicle’s burnt-out headlight, as this was an investigatory stop based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Appellant committed an equipment violation. The investigatory stop must, however, be limited in scope to the justification for the stop. Any expansion of the stop must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of additional illegal activity.

Here, the sergeant expanded the scope of the stop when he re-approached Appellant’s vehicle to investigate the marijuana odor. This expansion was based solely on the deputy’s report that he may have smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle. At the time of the stop, there were several lawful ways in which Appellant could possess cannabis without committing a crime (e.g., hemp, medical cannabis, or “small amount”), so the odor of marijuana on its own could not indicate illegal activity. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was no reasonable articulable suspicion for the sergeant to expand the stop.

Appellant’s trial counsel failed to move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the expanded stop, which rendered the attorney’s assistance ineffective. As all evidence used to convicted Appellant would have been suppressed upon such a motion, there is a reasonable probability that absent trial counsel’s error, the charge of conviction would have been dismissed, it was error for the postconviction court to deny Appellant’s postconviction petition. State v. Babineau, A23-1515, 2025 WL 1427646 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 2025).

IMPLED CONSENT: WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF AN EVENT DURING THE OBSERVATION PERIOD THAT AFFECTED THE TESTS RESULTS, AN IMPERFECT OBSERVATION DOES NOT RENDER THE TEST RESULTS INVALID

Respondent was arrested for DWI and transported to the jail, where he waited in the back of a squad car before being taken into the intake area. A deputy sat in the front driver’s seat. While waiting, the deputy asked Respondent to open his mouth and flip his tongue, and the deputy read the implied consent advisory to Respondent. Respondent was brought into the intake area at 12:02 a.m. The deputy told the correctional officer to administer the breath test at 12:15 p.m., as the observation period had started. The breath test procedure was completed, and the results showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08. Respondent’s driving privileges were revoked.

Respondent challenged the revocation, arguing, among other things, the breath test results were inadmissible because of the lack of an adequate observation period. After a hearing, the district court rescinded the revocation, finding the test results were unreliable due to the commissioner’s failure “to demonstrate a prima facie case that the administration of the test conformed to the procedures necessary to ensure reliability.”

The Court of Appeals finds the district court abused its discretion. Prior case law established that the commissioner meets its prima facie burden of showing the test is reliable and its administration conformed to procedures necessary to ensure reliability by showing a certified test operator administered the test, that diagnostic checks showed the machine was in working order, and the chemicals used were in proper condition. Here, the commissioner elicited testimony as to all of these factors, thus meeting its prima facie burden.

Respondent argues the incomplete pretest observation period prevents the commissioner from meeting its burden. However, a deficiency in the observation period does not by itself invalidate the test. Deficiencies in the observation period may be used to challenge the test’s reliability after the commissioner has met its burden. Again, however, mere presentation of a deficiency does not itself render a test unreliable – the driver must show something happened during the observation period (i.e., the driver ingested something or had some other bodily function, such as regurgitation) and that the ingestion or bodily function during the observation period affected the test result.

Respondent presented no evidence to counter the commissioner’s prima facie case, as he presented no evidence that he ingested something, regurgitated, burped, belched, or vomited during the observation period. Thus, the district court erred in determining the breath test results were unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of Respondent’s driving privileges. Knapp v. Comm’r Pub. Safety, A24-1440, 2025 WL 1427606 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 2025).

SENTENCING: “PRIOR FELONY SENTENCE” FOR A PERMISSIVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE DOES NOT INCLUDE A CONDITIONAL RELEASE TERM

Appellant was civilly committed as a sex offender at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). While serving a term of conditional release in connection with a prior assault of an MSOP employee, for which he had already served a term of imprisonment and supervised release, Appellant assaulted another MSOP employee, prompting the revocation of his conditional release and return to a DOC facility. While at the DOC facility, Appellant pleaded guilty to fourth-degree assault on a secure treatment facility employee for the assault. The district court sentenced Appellant to one year and one day for the assault offense, to be served consecutively with time served for the conditional release violation.

Under the sentencing guidelines, generally when a defendant “is convicted of multiple current offenses, or when there is a prior felony sentence that has not expired or been discharged, concurrent sentencing is presumptive.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F. Consecutive sentences are required under some circumstances and permissive under others. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.1-2. As is relevant here, a current felony conviction with a presumptive commitment may be sentenced consecutively to a prior felony sentence that has not expired or been discharged for certain prior felony convictions. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.a(1)(i).

“Prior felony sentence” is not defined in the sentencing guidelines and the phrase is ambiguous. After considering the circumstances of the guidelines’ enactment, prior versions, the guidelines’ purpose, the commission’s intent, and legislative history, the Court of Appeals interprets “prior felony sentence” in guideline 2.F.2.a(1)(i) to not include a conditional release term. Thus, the district court erred when it imposed a consecutive sentence, as Appellant’s prior felony sentence had expired at the time of sentencing, because he had already served the term of imprisonment and supervised release for the prior felony. State v. Lee, A24-0592, 2025 WL 1427602 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 2025).