September 2024

FIFTH AMENDMENT: IF THE DEFENDANT CONFESSES TO A HOMICIDE OFFENSE, THE STATE MUST INTRODUCE WITH EVIDENCE THAT REASONABLY TENDS TO PROVE THAT SOMEONE CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER PERSON IN A CRIMINAL MATTER

At Appellant’s trial for second-degree intentional murder, the State introduced evidence that he confessed to shooting his father and sister. He was found guilty but argued on appeal that the State failed to corroborate his confession.

Minn. Stat. § 634.03 provides that “[a] confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense charged has been committed.” Case law has interpreted this statute to require the State to present evidence independent of the confession that reasonably tends to prove that the crime charged actually occurred. This independent evidence must corroborate the corpus delicti elements of the crime—the injury or harm and the criminal nature of the injury or harm. For a homicide offense, the independent evidence must reasonably tend to prove that someone caused the death of another person in a criminal matter. The corroborating evidence need not reasonably tend to prove that the defendant was the person who caused the victim’s death.

The Court of Appeals finds the State presented evidence independent of Appellant’s confession that reasonably tended to prove someone caused the deaths of Appellant’s father and sister in a criminal manner, including the discovery of the victims with gunshot wounds to their heads, cartridge casings and a gun found at the scene, and the medical examiner’s conclusions that the shots were fired from a distance that would have made it impossible for the shots to be self-inflicted. Appellant’s convictions are affirmed. State v. Abdullah, A23-0750, 2024 WL 4022557 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2024).

PROCEDURE: DISTRICT COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION TO ALLOW A SUPPORT ANIMAL TO ACCOMPANY A WITNESS WHILE TESTIFYING AT TRIAL

At Appellant’s trial for criminal sexual conduct, the 15-year-old victim was allowed to testify while accompanied by a certified, trained support dog belonging to the county over Appellant’s objection that the support dog would elicit improper sympathy from the jury. Appellant appealed his convictions arguing the district court should not have allowed the support dog to accompany the victim and that the district court made various erroneous evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeals first affirms the challenged evidentiary rulings before addressing the support dog issue, an issue of first impression. The court holds that a district court’s decision as to whether allow the presence of a support dog at trial should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, finding that this decision falls within the court’s authority to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 611(a). In making such a decision, district courts may consider (1) the effect and helpfulness of the support animal to aid the witness’ testimony, (2) the risk of prejudice, and (3) the ability of the court to mitigate possible prejudice.

In this case, the court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a support dog to accompany the victim during her testimony, as the record shows the district court considered the victim’s fear and anxiety, the dog’s training and research on the benefit of support animals, and took steps to reduce any possible prejudice. Appellant’s convictions are affirmed. State v. Fernandez Sorto, A23-1564, 2024 WL 4112961 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2024).

PROCEDURE: A PARTY SEEKING TO REOPEN ITS CASE NEED NOT IMMEDIATELY TENDER THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IT SEEKS TO PRESENT

Appellant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. DNA samples from the victim were connected to Appellant’s DNA after testing. During trial, the forensic scientist who performed the tests was not able to testify. The State rested its case without presenting the DNA analysis evidence. Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court granted as to one of the counts. Before the trial adjourned for the weekend, the State learned the forensic scientist would be available to testify the following Monday. The district court granted the State’s motion to reopen its case, and, on Monday, the State called the forensic scientist to testify about the DNA analysis. The jury found Appellant guilty of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

On appeal, Appellant argues the district court should not have allowed the State to reopen its case because the State did not immediately tender the forensic scientist for testimony at the time of its motion to reopen. The court may permit a party to reopen its case to offer additional evidence in the interests of justice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 12(g). The court must consider (1) when the request was made, (2) whether the evidence is material, not cumulative, and concerns a controlling issue, and (3) whether there was an improper purpose for failing to produce the evidence earlier (“Caine factors”). While in every other reported case, the additional evidence was produced immediately upon reopening, there is no requirement in statute, rule, or caselaw that the evidence be produced immediately.

Here, the district court did not err by failing to deny the State’s motion because the State did not tender the forensic scientist’s testimony immediately after its motion to reopen. The district court also did not err in its consideration of the Caine factors. Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Ryan, A23-1645, 2024 WL 4112697 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2024).

FOURTH AMENDMENT: EVIDENCE FROM A SEARCH BEFORE TORGERSON NEED NOT BE SUPPRESSED

Prior to State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 2023), case law allowed police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle if police had probable cause to believe more than 1.4 grams of marijuana was in the vehicle. Before Torgerson was decided, Respondent was pulled over for a missing license plate and an object hanging from the rear-view mirror of his vehicle. When police approached, an officer smelled an odor of marijuana from the vehicle. Police then determined Respondent’s driver’s license was cancelled as inimical to public safety. While searching the vehicle, police found burnt marijuana roaches and a safe containing ammunition. Appellant was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by an ineligible person and driving after cancellation. The first trial resulted in a hung jury and the second was continued multiple times, eventually taking place after Torgerson was decided. The district court granted Appellant’s motion to suppress the ammunition found in his vehicle, in light of Torgerson. The ammunition charge was then dismissed, and the State appealed.

Warrantless searches are generally unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. However, the automobile exception allows warrantless searches of a vehicle, including closed containers therein, if there is probable cause to believe the search will result in the discovery of evidence or contraband. Under Torgerson, the odor of marijuana on its own is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle search – it is but one circumstance to be considered when examining the totality of the circumstances.

Evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search is generally inadmissible, but this exclusionary rule is not universally applied. For example, where law enforcement act in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent in conducting an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule is not applied to evidence obtained during the search. Prior to Torgerson, precedential cases from the Court of Appeals did specifically authorize an officer to search a vehicle based solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).

At the time of the search of Respondent’s vehicle, binding appellate precedent specifically authorized a vehicle search based on the odor of marijuana alone and the officer who searched Respondent’s vehicle acted in objectively reasonable reliance on that precedent. The district court erred in excluding evidence obtained during the search. Reversed and remanded. State v. Douglas, A24-0385, 2024 WL 4258754 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2024).

DWI: TRAINING REQUIREMENT FOR PERSON ADMINISTERING BREATH TEST IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF TEST REFUSAL OFFENSE

Appellant was convicted of refusal to submit to a breath test. On appeal, she argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction because the State did not present evidence that the deputy who requested the test was properly trained to administer it. The Court of Appeals holds that proof of the test administrator’s training is not an element of the test refusal offense and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction.

The test refusal statute criminalizes the refusal to submit to a chemical test of a person’s breath under the implied consent statute. The implied consent statute mandates consent to a chemical test and requires that certain prerequisite be satisfied before a person is legally obligated to complete a breath test, including probable cause to believe the person was driving while impaired. Case law has held that these prerequisites are incorporated into and are elements of the test refusal statute.

The implied consent statute also provides that the person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the Commissioner of Public Safety. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 7(c). This subdivision, however, is separate from the aforementioned prerequisites, and the Court of Appeals declines to include this training requirement in the elements of the crime of test refusal. Reading subdivision 7, which includes the training requirement, as a whole shows that the subdivision governs circumstances in which a test takes place, not when a test is refused.

The State was not required to prove the deputy who would have administered Appellant’s breath test was properly trained in the administration of breath tests. Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Smith, A23-1713, 2024 WL 4340086 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2024).