SENTENCING: “MAXIMUM PERIOD” THAT “MIGHT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED” IN MINN. STAT. § 609.135, SUBD. 2(b), MEANS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE
In December 2015, after Respondent pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct, he received a stay of imposition and was placed on probation for ten years. The district court found Respondent violated the terms of his probation and, in December 2023, vacated the stay of imposition, sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment, with execution stayed for ten years, and continued his initial ten-year probationary period. Community corrections recommended in September 2025 that Respondent’s sentence be executed for additional probation violations. However, Respondent was discharged from probation in December 2025 after the district court concluded his probation automatically expired on October 1, 2023, based on a 2023 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 609.135, subd. 2.
The amendment modified the maximum periods for stayed sentences for felony convictions, limiting the stay to “not more than five years or the maximum period for which the sentence of imprisonment might have been imposed, whichever is less,” unless the conviction is for certain felonies, including second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In that case, “the stay shall be for not more than four years or the maximum period for which the sentence of imprisonment might have been imposed, whichever is longer.” The probation term of anyone who served five or more years of probation for a felony and is eligible for resentencing under the amended statute is considered to have expired on October 1, 2023, unless the term of the stay of probation would have expired before that date under the original sentence or the length of probation is extended pursuant to section 609.135, subd. 2(h) or (i).
The question in this case is whether the “maximum period for which the sentence of imprisonment might have been imposed” is less than the probationary period that was imposed. The district court concluded the maximum presumptive sentence the district court could impose was the top of the presumptive guidelines sentence and, because that sentence was less than the ten-year probationary period imposed and Respondent had served more than five years on probation when the law took effect, Respondent’s probation automatically expired on October 1, 2023.
The Court of Appeals disagrees with the district court’s interpretation, finding that the “maximum period for which the sentence of imprisonment might have been imposed” unambiguously refers to the statutory maximum sentence. Here, the statutory maximum sentence for Respondent’s conviction is 25 years. Thus, the ten-year probationary period originally imposed was permissible because it was less than the statutory maximum sentence and, because the probationary period was longer than the four-year period in the amended law, the district court erred in determining Respondent’s probation automatically expired on October 1, 2023. The district court’s order discharging Respondent from probation is reversed. State v. Mitchell, A26-0308, 2026 WL 2635273 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2026).
EVIDENCE: COURTS SHOULD APPLY RULES OF EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO ADMIT ALTERNATIVE-PERPETRATOR EVIDENCE
Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree intentional murder and argued his convictions should be reversed due to the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to identify another individual as an alternative perpetrator. Previously, courts applied the Hawkins test to determine whether alternative-perpetrator evidence should be admitted, which required the defendant to first make a foundational proffer of “evidence having an inherent tendency to connect [the alternative perpetrator] with the actual commission of the crime.” State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn. 1977). If this requirement is met, the defendant may then be allowed to introduce evidence which would tend to prove another person committed the crime, if the evidence satisfies the ordinary rules of evidence.
The Supreme Court holds that the threshold-foundation inquiry should no longer be applied. Instead, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence alone should be applied to determine whether to admit alternative-perpetrator evidence, to “improve the fairness of judicial proceedings” and “make judicial proceedings simpler, more efficient, and more understandable for all involved.”
While the district court found in this case that Appellant did not satisfy the Hawkins threshold-foundation step, the Supreme Court finds the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirms Appellant’s conviction. However, because the district court orally entered a conviction only for first-degree murder, but the written order erroneously showed convictions for both first- and second-degree murder, the matter is remanded to the district court to remove the judgment of conviction for second-degree murder. State v. Bucholz, A25-0518 (Minn. Sept. 30, 2026).